The inherent ethics

and integrity of education by Godon, Rafal & Hogan, Padraig
kultura pedagogiczna 1/2014
the inherent ethics  
and integrity oF edUcation
Rafał Godoń 
University of Warsaw, Poland
Pádraig Hogan
National University of Ireland Maynooth, Ireland
Abstract. The paper begins with some introductory remarks that explain why understanding 
education as a coherent human practice is necessary for a proper account of ethics in the 
field of education. The authors take three steps: presenting education as a practice in its 
own right, discussing the concept of thinking in the context of educational practice and 
finally revealing some practical consequences of the inherent ethics of education. The 
paper invites readers to further investigation rather than giving  ready-at-hand answers. 
It challenges conventional approaches to ethics in education and seeks to provide a more 
adequate and appropriate context for pedagogical discourse on ethics.
introduction 
some opening questions concerning ethics  
as a field of study in relation to education 
We wish to argue the case that the ethics of education arise in the first place 
from the demands that are inherent to education itself as a  coherent human 
practice. The argument we will be making stands in marked contrast to a widely 
held view that the ethical orientations of education are to be supplied by a body 
of superiors, such as a Church, or the current government, or other institutional 
power. The priority given to institutional political power in this common view 
consigns educational action mainly to the ranks of subordinates, but it also com-
municates an unexamined assumption that this is the natural order of things, 
notwithstanding major political changes. To take a prominent historical example, 
when Napoleon Bonaparte saw himself as emancipating French education from 
the control of the church, he did not promote the further step of enhancing the 
influence and decision-making capacities of educational practitioners. Rather, he 
left hierarchical assumptions and practices very much in place but his reforms 
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served to recast the entire order of values that the new centralised educational 
system would be called on to serve. 
The argument we are keen to make contrasts not only with standpoints that 
make educational practice an essentially subordinate domain to the wielding 
of political-institutional power. It also contrasts with philosophical standpoints 
which hold that the ethics of education are to be supplied by one or other ethical 
theory, such as utilitarianism, a deontological ethics, a teleological ethics, or even 
an ethics of care. It is not that the insights yielded by such theories are devoid of 
relevance. It is rather that the priority given to theory and its formal conceptual 
demonstrations tends to eclipse the specific and many-sided nature of the ethical 
challenges that occur within educational practice itself. Something similar might 
be said of other practices, for instance, nursing or medicine; but as we shall see 
below, the case of education presents particular difficulties. 
To get our enquiry under way we have identified three questions that arise 
from these introductory remarks. 
1. Why is ethics a more problematic issue for education than for other fields? 
One central reason is because education is widely viewed as ‘a highly contested 
field’. Let us simply call this ‘the contestation thesis’. That is to say, education is 
seen as an arena where competing values do battle. A national report on research 
in education in US in 2002 puts it succinctly: ‘People’s hopes and expectations 
for educating the young are integrally tied to their hopes and expectations about 
the direction of society and its development’ (Shavelson & Towne, 2002, p.17). 
Consider for a  moment how this prevalent view – which promptly brings the 
plurality of human aspirations under macro questions about ‘the direction of so-
ciety’ – influences the tenor of educational policy and practice at an institutional 
level. It is just this kind of ‘natural aspiration’ that fuels the assumption that the 
ethics of education are to receive their main orientation and character from some 
higher body, democratically elected or otherwise. The unvoiced assumption here 
is that education does not have inherent values – values that arise from education 
as coherent practice in its own right. Control over the conduct of educational 
undertakings thus becomes the prerogative of what Plato was pleased to call 
‘the stronger party’. In totalitarian societies this can be readily perceived as 
indoctrination, but in democratic societies the possibility of periodically changing 
a  government by popular ballot tends to lessen, if not quite remove such 
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concerns. But democratic societies are also ones where ‘the direction of society’ 
is rarely far from controversial debate or robust disagreement. Thus the habits 
of democratic life itself, when fuelled by dubious assumptions of long ancestry, 
allow the view of education as a primary arena of contestation to prevail. 
We will not be suggesting that educational practice, or the leadership of such 
practice, can be made independent of powerful political influences. The history 
of education, West and East, is replete with examples of education being made 
the instrument of church, or of state, or of industry and commerce. What we hope 
to point out, rather, is that the coherence of education as a public undertaking 
requires at least some recognition that it is a practice with inherent purposes of 
its own: i.e. different from those of church, or state, or other powerful bodies 
in society. This recognition of the integrity (or integral-ness) of education invo-
lves public trust: an acknowledgement that in some key senses education is not 
a contested field.
2. Are there particular difficulties in finding application for the major ethical 
theories in the conduct of educational practice?
Our answer to this question is that there are. There are many theories which 
seek to shed light on ethics – including theories of deontological ethics, consequ-
entialist ethics, virtue ethics, utilitarian ethics, care ethics and so on. But none of 
these theories in itself provides a satisfactory approach for the ethics of specific 
practices: for instance, the ethics of medical practice, the ethics of engineering 
practice, the ethics of educational practice. In these instances the ethics for the 
conduct of the practice must arise firstly from the particular nature and purposes 
of the practice in question. Where there is a large measure of agreement on such 
purposes, or at least on some core purposes, the ethics of the practice can be 
articulated in a fairly coherent way, albeit that disagreements and difficulties will 
still arise. Where the practice of medicine is concerned, earlier and subsequent 
versions of the Hippocratic Oath provide an example of what is involved here. 
Such examples show moreover that ethical disagreements are not laid to rest for 
good, even in practices where core purposes command wide assent. But things 
are more thorny if the practice in question is regarded as a  ‘highly contested 
field’, and if large numbers of practitioners themselves acquiesce in this view. 
In such circumstances it is hard to see how significant progress can be made in 
articulating a coherent and defensible practitioner ethics. 
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3. What then is really problematic in the relationship between ethics and 
education? 
A  historical perspective is important for any adequate approach to this 
question. Such a perspective allows us to see just how influential the infusion, or 
more critically the imposition, of a body of values on educational practitioners 
from above has been. This infusion has been characteristically accomplished by 
one or other institutionalized power, chiefly those of a church or state, though 
more recently forces of a  more commercial kind have been jostling for such 
power. Such infusion, or imposition, fails to acknowledge that education is or 
could be a coherent practice in its own right; a practice that has its own inherent 
ethical imperatives. The record of effective influences in the history of Western 
education shows that the strategy of using education to advance the influence of 
ascendant powers has a long ancestry. On the face of it, it looks like a problem 
that could be traced to the paternalistic design for education in Plato’s Republic; 
or to the political control of education that Aristotle argued for in books 7 and 8 
of his Politics. In fact however, the historically effective origins lie less with Plato 
and Aristotle than with the Neoplatonism of Augustine and other early Christian 
thinkers from the fourth century onwards. The decisive event here was not just 
the adoption of Christianity as the religion of the Roman Empire. Also crucial was 
the transformation of Christianity itself from a religion of spiritual aspiration for 
individuals and communities into forms of paternalism and custodianship that 
were to become powerful beyond all precedent. 
These initial explorations of our three opening questions provide the back-
ground to our main investigation, which we will now begin.
Part one 
education as a practice in its own right: first steps
There are ethical imperatives that arise from the distinct purposes of education 
itself, when education is considered as a  practice in its own right. To speak of 
education as a practice in its own right is not to suggest that it should enjoy 
an absolute form of independence. Every practice that aims at some distinct 
benefits must be answerable for its progress, or lack of progress, in promoting 
and sharing these benefits. Every practice is also affected to a greater or lesser 
degree by social and historical influences in the context in which the practice is 
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carried on. To regard education as a practice in its own right moreover is not to 
regard it as a uniform kind of action, far less a monolithic form of action. Rather, 
it is to call attention to a range of practices of learning that share some recognis- 
able features, such as the following for instance: 
• practices that are not harnessed in advance to the goals of one or other 
institution; 
• practices that continually seek to identify the particular range of potentiali-
ties native to each learner; 
• practices that endeavour to nourish such potentialities through forms of 
learning that bring benefits of mind and heart to others as much as to oneself;
• practices that take human differences seriously and seek to promote more 
a profusion of human flourishing than any alignment of capacities and commit- 
ments to one or other ‘ism’. 
Underlying such practices of learning is an important acknowledgement that 
illuminates the ‘integrity’ mentioned in our title: namely the ethical orientations, 
and the tenor of action, of education itself as a distinct human undertaking. This 
is an acknowledgement of the limitations that attend even the most advanced 
achievements of human understanding: a  recognition that the fruits of such 
achievements (knowledge, skills, theories etc) are still only partial, and in both 
senses of that word: they are (a) incomplete; (b) influenced by the previous inter-
pretations and judgements that one has internalised. 
Such an acknowledgement is implicit in a suggestive way in those learning 
communities disclosed in the early (though not the later) dialogues of Plato; 
dialogues like Euthyphro, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Bk 1 of the Republic. In these 
instances the pedagogical action of Socrates carries the most fertile suggestive- 
ness, while also giving pause for a more searching kind of thinking. In the early 
dialogues the outcome of the encounters is usually some decisive advance in 
ethical insight, not just for those present, but also for today’s readers of the 
dialogues. But such advance characteristically lacks the certainty of an authorita-
tive final word. Rather, it discloses at the same time a deeper understanding of 
the nature of the issue under enquiry and of one’s own and others’ limitations 
in relation to that issue. One could rightly call it a more educated sense of one’s 
own ignorance, and of the relative ignorance of humankind more widely.
This twofold acknowledgement (a deeper understanding of human finitude 
and limitation and the unsettling of a  self-assured certainty in relation to 
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knowledge) constitutes the heart of a Socratic educational legacy, properly so 
called. Such a legacy is a stranger to most forms of metaphysics and epistemolo-
gy, as understood and carried out in Western traditions of philosophy. But from 
the middle of the first millennium the conduct of schools, and later colleges and 
universities, became deeply influenced by institutionalised and prevalent forms 
of both metaphysics and epistemology: – of metaphysics in earlier centuries 
and of epistemology in more recent ones. All too rarely is it noticed that these 
developments mark the enduring eclipse of a distinctly Socratic educational legacy, 
including the powerful ethical-pedagogical orientations native to that legacy. 
But one should not conclude here that there has been an irrevocable loss. 
Some of the most probing philosophical researches of the twentieth century have 
made explicit, and progressively more so, what remained implicit in the Socratic 
learning communities. We can for instance, evidence decisive contributions from 
widely different philosophers: from Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Arendt, Dewey, 
Popper, Gadamer, Patočka, Tischner that share in one way or another the Socratic 
insight expressed in provocative terms by Gadamer: ‘It is not so much our judge- 
ments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being’ (Gadamer, 1976, p.9). 
This kind of insight, when correctly understood as an inescapable feature of 
human understanding itself, opens in new ways the kind of eclipsed suggestive-
ness we mentioned above. It uncovers certain kind of ethical orientations rather 
than others where defensible practices of teaching and learning are concerned. 
Accordingly it also helps to highlight the particular kinds of thinking that are 
appropriate to actions that are properly educational. To a closer investigation of 
such thinking and action we now turn our attention.
part two 
thinking and action in education
For centuries philosophers have dreamt of finding one conclusive, objective 
way of understanding all that the universe holds, including the world that humans 
inhabit. For centuries also others have retained vestiges of a  largely eclipsed 
Socratic inheritance by challenging this dream of a conclusive grasp of finite things 
and ultimate reality. The latter efforts have tried to show that such a dream is dan-
gerous, and seriously so, for human flourishing: that the epistemological quest 
for certainty needs to yield to other, more open, more democratic and dialogical 
ways of understanding all that human experience encounters, not least the world 
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as our place of living. The history of ideas tells us that the tension between these 
contrasting tendencies has had a huge influence on European culture, particularly 
on philosophical thinking. This has led to many conflicts and disagreements, not 
only in intellectual life but also and in the conduct of professions in everyday life, 
including educational professions. Edmund Husserl’s 1935 Vienna lecture, ‘Philo-
sophy in the Crisis of European Mankind’, serves as a philosophical landmark in 
establishing a critical consciousness of this tension (Husserl, 1965). In identifying 
key obstacles to the kind of thinking that is most appropriate to truth-seeking 
enquiries in sciences and humanities, Husserl’s ‘crisis’ reflections mark a water-
shed; one between the objectivism of epistemologies informed by Enlightenment 
rationalism and the more inclusive reach of subsequent philosophical efforts 
that rejected objectivism. The tension between a strict objectivity stance on the 
one hand and a more dialogical style of reflection on the other has a significant 
impact on the way educational practice comes to be understood. It is a tension 
that adds a further layer of difficulties to the long-established ones arising from 
acrimonies between contesting parties in the field of public education. So it is all 
the more necessary to clarify here the kind of thinking that belongs to education 
as a practice in its own right. Without such clarity it may be futile to talk, as we 
do in our title, of the inherent ethics and integrity of education. 
Not every kind of thinking that is practised in education is helpful for under-
standing this integrity. Even the more ‘professional’ forms of thinking in education 
might serve to becloud rather than reveal the kind of integrity at issue. Everyday 
‘professional’ thinking in education is often a kind of cognitive psychology, or 
psychology of learning, constrained by taxonomies that reside in certain forms 
of psychology. By contrast, educational thinking  – that which informs the actions 
of genuine practitioners – is a really complex and reflective experience. To seek 
to capture its characteristics properly we will need some philosophical figures or 
metaphors. Here we will identify and differentiate between four features of such 
thinking: (a) personal engagement, (b) being in jeopardy, (c) encountering the 
otherness and (d) opening new horizons. 
(a) Personal engagement
The first feature of a  distinctly educational kind of thinking that we can 
identify concerns the kind of reflexivity present in the practitioner’s efforts to 
deal with problematic issues or predicaments. All too often here the practitioner 
relies chiefly on established routines and procedures while neglecting to relate 
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the issue at hand to a probing critical reflection. To illustrate with an example, 
in addressing a misconduct issue in a classroom a teacher draws on professio-
nal knowledge and objective expertise mastered during training and continual 
professional development courses. But in doing so she may habitually relegate 
or overlook valuable insights that a critical reflection on her own experiences as 
a teacher, and those of colleagues, might have to offer. While acknowledging that 
professional expertise in teaching makes available many promising possibilities, 
we would stress that it is a serious mistake not to include in such possibilities 
those that are more deeply rooted in the teacher’s own life. To neglect to do 
so is to bypass the core of the ethical issues that arise from within educational 
practice itself. Dewey remarks perceptively on this in Experience and Education: 
‘The mature person, to put it in moral terms, has no right to withhold from the 
young on given occasions whatever capacity for sympathetic understanding his 
own experience has given him.’ (Dewey, 1938/1997, p. 38). In short, personally 
engaged thinking in education involves the whole of one’s questioning expe-
rience. This distinguishes it from a thinking that takes its orientation merely or 
mainly from institutionalised professional habits, not least those connected with 
school rules, and with examination and test routines. 
(b) Being in jeopardy
When any person, not just a teacher, reflects critically on issues that originate 
in one’s personal experience, that experience receives a  ‘second reading’, but 
now in a  reflective and questioning mode. Limitations, missed opportunities 
and wrong turnings come to light, as well as accomplishments in which one can 
take an enduring satisfaction. Such reflection also helps to uncover previously 
undetected prejudices and to bring before oneself the unknown or even perilous 
aspects of one’s life. The desire for a  safe or cosy place in the world is thus 
confronted by the necessities of living in an unpredictable reality. Only with this 
kind of questioning experience is the person really ready to start the journey 
called for in educational thinking. This is a kind of thinking that puts one’s self- 
understanding and one’s understanding of the world in jeopardy, so to speak; it 
is a thinking that unsettles the settled tenor of one’s outlooks; a thinking that 
accepts responsibility for building learning environments that seek to provide 
a rich quality of educational experience. It involves a willingness to experience 
risky situations as a part of one’s practice, not just of one’s research. 
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(c) The other as a stranger
We began our analysis of thinking with ‘personal engagement’ and then 
we moved to the reflection on being ready to experience the risky side of any 
serious questioning. An important consequence of the latter is the attitude that 
presupposes openness to the experience of the unfamiliar. This involves a shift 
of perspective on the part of both interlocutors, the one who poses the question 
and the listener who in turn reacts to the question. Thus, when we pinpointed 
the experience of risky situations as a necessary part of educational thinking, we 
shifted from the position of ‘I’ to the position of ‘Thou’ (Gadamer, 1975, p. 321 
ff.). From that moment on, the other cannot be understood as a mere object of 
cognition, as a resource to be used, or as an event to be endured. To experience 
the other means first of all to accept the situation when ‘Thou’ surprises us with 
her unfamiliarity or strangeness. It is not possible to foresee the other in her 
fullness, or to reduce her to our presuppositions. Thinking, when it is the kind 
of educational experience that we are exploring here, takes from the outset the 
form of encountering. Good teachers genuinely encounter their students in their 
otherness, even though they must experience the unexpected and sometimes 
even distressing consequences. 
(d) The power to change
In everyday educational practice routine is almost unavoidable. Notwith-
standing the fact that teachers and educators try to avoid repetitiveness and to 
bring freshness to their work, teaching and learning are frequently dominated by 
reproduction and by rote. It is often said that education should be innovative. 
But is it really possible to become creative in an atmosphere of learning by rote 
and rehearsing for tests? Educational thinking, it must be emphasised, not only 
embraces the situations when we meet something new. From the start it includes 
the expectation that it leads to new standards of understanding and acting, to new 
ways of solving problems, both theoretical and practical. This why in European 
culture thinking, from its beginning in its Greek philosophical modes, is under-
stood as a  good way of changing the world for the better. That is not to say 
that words have a mainly performative function and when we pronounce them 
they transform objects with magical power. The real power of any transformative 
thinking comes not from any magic but from the inter-subjective dimension of any 
real understanding. In that sense educational thinking, understood as a kind of 
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personal practice, always changes the world since it offers its participants the new 
horizons of seeing and acting upon the matter at issue. In other words, as distinct 
from something merely cognitive or preparatory, educational thinking is itself 
from the start a form of thinking-in-action as well as a form of thinking-on-action. 
part three 
the inherent ethics of education – some practical consequences
The import for educational practice of the kind of thinking we have been 
considering can be explored in the main domains of action of pedagogy itself. We 
have identified four such domains here, not as an exhaustive list, but rather as 
four central and interweaving aspects of educational relationships which high-
light the nature of the kind of ethics involved in educational practice. The four 
domains are: (a) the teacher’s relationship to the subject or material being taught; 
(b) the teacher’s relationship to his/her students; (c) the teacher’s relationship to 
colleagues, parents, educational authorities and a wider range of others; (d) the 
teacher’s relationship to him/herself, within which the ethical significance of the 
other three relationships is decided. 
(a) The teacher’s relationship to the subject or material being studied
Where the teacher’s relationship with a  subject is concerned – e.g. econo-
mics, physics, history – it bypasses the heart of the matter if one regards this 
as a matter of competence in a body of knowledge and skills that is ready and 
waiting for transmission. If the subject in question is not alive and communica- 
tive within the teacher’s ongoing relationships to it, it’s unlikely that students will 
experience the worlds of possibility, challenge and discovery to be opened up by 
the subject in question. That’s to say, the teacher needs to build a relationship to 
the subject as to a neighbourhood, or range of neighbourhoods, in which she has 
become at home; but not in the sense of a cosy repose for thought and action. 
Such neighbourhoods contain not only their own harmonies, but also their own 
long-standing acrimonies. Moreover, they are not neighbourhoods characterised 
by horizons that are everywhere familiar. Rather, they are characterised by invita-
tions that beckon and demands that lead quite beyond such horizons. Yet, they 
remain neighbourhoods into which students must be invited ever anew, and in 
ways that evoke and sustain the students’ genuine potentials and energies. This 
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gives a new understanding of the notion of fluency, not just in languages but in 
all subjects of study. Fluency now becomes understood less as a skill available for 
deployment and more as the ever renewed fruits of a vibrant personal relationship 
to one or more inheritances of learning. The ethical core of this relationship lies 
in embracing the challenges involved in its own renewal and enhancement. But it 
also lies in becoming more mindful of the biases as well as the benefits that are 
continually encountered in inheritances of learning themselves, from the most 
ancient to the most recent. From an ethical standpoint then, when the subject 
comes to voice in one’s teaching it seeks to address the students in the manner of 
an invitation, if sometimes a challenging one. This distinguishes it from any action 
that makes a proprietorial claim, overt or implicit, on students’ minds and hearts. 
These references to students bring us now to the second domain of relationship. 
(b) The teacher’s relationship to his/her students
When viewed from any adequate pedagogical perspective, teachers’ relations 
with students are more accurately conceived of as an ongoing interplay than as 
a transmission of any kind. Crucial to the purpose of such relations is that they 
seek to enable students to become active and responsible participants in their 
own learning. For students this kind of enablement means taking unforced steps 
toward the discovery of their own potentialities and limitations, in response to 
the voices that engage them in a buoyant community of learning – e.g. in maths, 
in music, in Polish, and so on. It’s important to add that it is the reciprocal realisa-
tion of such relations, among students themselves as well as with their teachers, 
that allows environments of learning to become properly fruitful. This realisation 
involves continually renewed efforts from the teacher, but also from students, 
and it remains invariably incomplete. It is properly to be viewed as a progres-
sive attainment of an aim-in-view, yet an ever-partial one, rather than any final 
accomplishment. It remains vulnerable moreover to setbacks, distortions, and 
even collapse. Recognition of the importance of this reciprocal dimension identi-
fies a range of ethical responsibilities on the teacher’s part that are rarely enough 
in evidence in more customary conceptions of teaching. These ethical responsibili- 
ties embody the kinds of thinking investigated in the previous section. They include, 
for instance, the moral insight and perseverance necessary to draw learners as 
active and responsible participants into a vibrant learning environment; or the 
courage to put one’s own truth claims at risk in front of one’s students; or the 
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foresight to envisage promising pathways for diverse kinds of learners and the 
commitment to explore these pathways anew with one’s students. Pedagogical 
virtues such as these – the examples could run to a long list – also help to restrain 
impulses in the teacher-student interplay that tend more to a rule of domination 
and submission, or of recurring acrimony. 
(c) The teacher’s relationship to colleagues, parents and others
Where relations with colleagues, parents, educational authorities and others 
in wider society are concerned, this, like the former two domains, could readily be 
subdivided. Critical analysis of this domain moreover, and of its sub-spheres, can 
illustrate how pervasive the forces of domination and coercion can become. The 
history of education in Western civilisation is replete with examples of unequal 
power relations as an institutionalised norm: between older and younger teachers, 
between teachers and school managements, between teachers and parents, 
between teachers and policy authorities, and so on. In fact such analyses have 
contributed in no small way to the idea that educational thought and action is 
essentially a field of contestation, or even a battleground for ideologies. But critical 
analyses of this kind fall short of their own best purposes if they fail to make explicit 
the question implied in all critique of human practices: Critique for the sake of 
what? Recall here that education is a deliberate human practice, as distinct from 
a natural phenomenon, or biological process. It’s when this practical question is 
engaged with that the real educational-ethical possibilities of this third domain of 
relations comes properly into view. To capture this view succinctly: one’s teaching 
colleagues are prized as sources of constructive criticism and ideas; parents and 
guardians are properly regarded as supportive partners; educational authorities 
as potential sources of coherent and soundly based policy; and the public mainly 
as a body whose trust is necessary, but earned. This, it should be stressed, is less 
a theory of professional relationships than an unveiling of the kind of sustained 
pedagogical-ethical work that actually needs to be done in the everyday conduct 
of professional practice. Some might argue that ethical orientations like those just 
outlined may be all fine in theory, but that they are too idealistic for practice. To 
such an argument it is necessary to point out a fundamental error: the difficulties 
here are simply not difficulties of a theoretical character. Indeed the very practical 
character of the orientations called for in this third domain of relationships high-
lights the real nature of the difficulties involved. The ethical tensions that have 
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to be negotiated here are inescapably rooted in the specific challenges that the 
various parties – teachers, school leaderships, parents/guardians – have to face in 
seeking to make educational practice itself fruitful. 
(d) The teacher’s relationship to himself or herself 
This is the fourth domain of relationship we have identified. More simply, 
we can describe this as the teacher’s self-understanding. This is where the other 
three relationships come together – profitably or otherwise – to orient in one 
way or another the teacher’s thinking and actions. For instance, my relationship 
as a  teacher to the subjects I  teach might be a cherished one that continually 
attracts me to new and invigorating encounters within these subjects. But I might 
be disposed in a different way towards my students, frequently resenting their 
lack of appreciation of my efforts. My relations with my students might indeed be 
fraught with difficulties that remain largely unaddressed, and possibly intractable. 
One might call this a lack of ‘know how’ or of ‘pedagogical content knowledge’, 
to use a common technical phrase. Rather than the possession of a ‘know-how’ or 
competence, however, what is at issue is more a lack of attunement to the kind 
of ethical insight that orients one’s attitudes and actions as a practitioner. It is 
less a matter of having this or that competence and more a question of a way of 
being and relating. 
In any case this kind of shortfall could be an enduring feature of a practi- 
tioner’s capability, or more precisely incapability, in one or more of the domains 
of relationship that combine to give learning environments their particular cha-
racter. In fact one might be seeking refuge from unaddressed difficulties in one 
domain by an excessive preoccupation with another. Such mis-perceptions in 
one’s self-understanding as a  teacher can have quite distorting consequences 
for the professional attitudes and practices that flow from that understanding. 
These consequences become very concrete ones when they affect the quality of 
learning experiences among students and the quality of the learning environment 
where these experiences take place. It is crucial therefore to develop an ethical 
approach that keeps the intermingling domains of coherent educational action 
itself constantly in the foreground. 
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conclusion
We believe that these briefly-sketched points identify many promising paths 
for ethical enquiry in the field of education. But they cannot do so in any ample 
way if educational practice itself is already effectively harnessed to the impera- 
tives of one or more powerful institutions in society. That is why we have emphasis- 
ed from the start the importance of understanding education as a practice in its 
own right. The paths we have been trying to uncover moreover cannot be clearly 
discerned if ethical enquiry in education begins with borrowings from this or that 
ethical theory, insightful though many of the insights from such theory can be. 
These paths can only be sketched in outline in an essay of this scope. But we trust 
that our arguments reveal something central about the nature of the work that 
needs to be undertaken and renewed if it is to render educational ethics itself 
coherent as a field of thought and action.
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